In the electronic commerce context, it is common that a customer wishes to buy a pack of products/services composed of several products/services from different merchants. The customer is interested in buying all products from the pack or no product at all. On the other hand, sometimes the customer wants to buy exactly one product from many merchants, and for this, he specifies in his request more possible products according to his preferences but from these options only one will be committed. The combination in any form of these two types of e-commerce transactions will be named complex transaction. Despite the great variety of multi-party fair exchange protocols proposed until now, there is no solution to address to physical products delivery in complex transactions. In this paper, we propose the first e-commerce protocol for physical products delivery in complex transactions that provides fair exchange and anonymity of the customer.
INTRODUCTION
In the electronic commerce, there are situations in that a customer wishes to buy a pack of products/services composed of several products (physical or digital)/services from different merchants. In this type of e-commerce transactions, the customer is interested in buying all products from the pack or no product at all, namely aggregate/atomic transactions. For flexibility, in the optional transactions, the customer wants to buy exactly one product from many merchants, and for this, he specifies in his request more possible products according to his preferences but from these options only one will be committed. We will refer to the combination in any form of aggregate and optional transactions as complex transactions.
In e-commerce protocols, fair exchange is an essential property. For complex transactions, an ecommerce protocol in that a customer wishes to buy many products from different merchants assures fair exchange if:
• for any optional transaction from the complex transaction, the customer obtains exactly one product in order of his specified preferences, and
• for any aggregate transaction from the complex transaction, the customer obtains all products, and each merchant obtains the payment for the corresponding product, or none of them obtains nothing. In a complex transaction, the issues that can appear are when in a aggregate transaction some products can be successfully acquired, but the others not, or when in an optional transaction more than one product is successfully acquired. In these cases, even if each corresponding merchant gets the payment for his product, fair exchange is not ensured. To achieve fair exchange, most of the proposed protocols are based on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that acts like item validator or to solve the disputes.
Anonymity of the customer is a key property that must be considered in a fair exchange e-commerce protocol. The customer may not want to reveal sensitive data of his identity (as credit card number, information about customer's bank, customer's account number) so that this information can not be used by merchant in commercial purpose to build spending habits of the customer. An e-commerce protocol provides the customer's anonymity if no party and no coalition between parties can link the customer's true identity with his actions. To obtain customer's anonymity in our protocol,the challenge is to guarantee this requirement both in payment and collection of physical products.
Until now there are protocols proposed for physical products delivery that provide fair exchange and consider only one customer and one merchant (Birjoveanu, 2015; Djuric and Gasevic, 2015; Alaraj, 2012; Li et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2006) and from all this solutions the one proposed in (Birjoveanu, 2015) provides also anonymity for both customer and merchant.
There are known many multi-party fair exchange protocols proposed with applications in e-commerce transactions for buying digital goods (Liu, 2009) , digital signature of contracts (Draper-Gil et al., 2013; Onieva et al., 2009) , and certified e-mail (Onieva et al., 2009) . Despite great variety of multi-party fair exchange protocols proposed until now, there is no solution to address our problem: complex transactions where a customer wants to buy several physical products from different merchants, providing fair exchange and anonymity.
From all known solutions for multi-party fair exchange, no one can be applied to our problem. First, all proposed solutions exchange digital items, while our problem involves exchange between electronic payment and physical products delivery. Secondly, some multi-party non-repudiation solutions exchange different messages (Onieva et al., 2009 ) in a one-tomany configuration, without taken in to consideration atomicity, while our problem involves one customer that wants to buy several products while preserving atomicity. Thirdly, the scenario most closed to our scenario is the one proposed by (Liu, 2009) , where in an aggregate transaction, a customer wants to buy from different merchants several digital products. The solution from (Liu, 2009) can not be applied to our problem because the protocol architecture for physical products delivery is more complex than for digital products: delivery agents are needed for physical products delivery from merchants to customer. Also, in (Liu, 2009 ) optional transactions and anonymity are not considered. Our contribution. In this paper, we propose a new anonymous fair exchange e-commerce protocol for complex transactions in that the customer wants to buy several different physical products from different merchants. In our scenario, a complex transaction is a combination in any form of aggregate and optional transactions. Our solution is the first that addresses to physical product delivery in complex transactions. Also, our protocol provides non-repudiation, integrity and confidentiality of data exchanged between the parties.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 gives an informal description, section 3 presents the protocol, section 4 provides an analysis of the proposed protocol and section 5 contains the conclusion.
INFORMAL DESCRIPTION
Our protocol has applications in Business to Consumer (B2C) and Business to Business (B2B) scenarios. For a B2B scenario, the customer is the Electron company that manufactures electronic boards for different purposes, on request from his clients. To plan its business, Electron uses an online catalog from where it can buy several electronic components from different merchants denoted by M1, M2, M3, e.t.c. From the online catalog, Electron can select products like: resistors (R), capacitors (C), integrated circuits (IC), cables, connectors, printed circuit boards (PCB) and so on. Electron wants to start the production of a new electronic board and therefore wants to prepare its order in form of an e-commerce complex transaction as follows: (100R of 10kΩ from M1 or 70R of 20kΩ from M2) and (50C of 100mF from M3 or 100C of 70mF from M4) and 70 connectors DB35 type from M5 and 30PCB from the M6. The complex transaction is composed from an aggregate transaction and two optional transactions. For the first optional transaction if Electron can not acquire 100R of 10kΩ from M1 due to lack of stock or delay in delivery time, then its second option is taken into consideration to acquire 70R of 20kΩ from M2. To start the production, Electron needs all types of components specified in its request, so a partial combination (e.g. 100R of 10kΩ, 100C of 70mF and 30PCB, but without 70 connectors DB35 type) is not useful for him. For an optional transaction, Electron must not acquire more than one product (e.g. for the first optional transaction he must not acquire both 100R of 10kΩ and 70R of 20kΩ) because then he will remain with unnecessary products. For example, a pack of products that solves the customer's options is: 100R of 10kΩ, and 100C of 70mF, and 70 connectors DB35 type and 30PCB.
A similar scenario can be used in B2C applications. In this case, the customer is a person that likes electronics and wants to build an electronic hobby kit, and for this he uses the online catalog to order the needed components.
The protocol we propose uses an online TTP that will validate the customer's coins and will provide fair exchange if any party misbehaves or prematurely aborts. The customer may choose to remain anonymous during the protocol execution. Our protocol uses the electronic cash payment mechanism based on group blind digital signatures on behalf of the banks proposed in (Lysyanskaya and Ramzan, 1998) to provide anonymity of the customer in the payment phase. To ensure anonymity of the customer in the physical delivery phase, our protocol is based on a delivery agent that takes the product from the merchant and provide it to a destination cabinet, where the access to the physical products is protected by passwords.
Next, we will informally describe the protocol. When the customer decides the products pack he wants to buy and the options for each product from the pack, he clicks a "submit" button on the online catalog. In back-end, the protocol searches a sequence of subtransactions to satisfy the customer's options in order of preferences he supplies. A subtransaction is a sequence of protocol's steps in which the customer buys a certain physical product from a certain merchant.
Our protocol can run in multiple rounds. One protocol round consists of three sub-protocols: the Agreement sub-protocol, the Delivery sub-protocol and the Payment sub-protocol. In Agreement, a sequence of subtransactions is started as a possible solution for customer's choices. For each subtransaction, the customer buys a digital coin from his bank and validates it to T T P. The customer sends to the merchant the purchase order and the digital signature of T T P and the merchant replies to confirm the agreement on subtransaction's terms. The Agreement will be completed either with all subtransactions successfully finished or all aborted. If all subtransactions successfully finished Agreement, then Delivery simultaneous realizes the physical delivery of products from these subtransactions. After all products from the subtransactions involved in Delivery are posted to the destination cabinet, the customer collects the products and provides it an evidence of the products collection. If Delivery is successfully for all subtransactions, then Payment simultaneously performs the payment for these subtransactions.
In a protocol round some subtransactions can be aborted without solving the customer's options in that round. If the customer's options are not completely explored, new protocol rounds will be executed to search a sequence of subtransactions that will satisfy his choices. The protocol terminates after a round that solves the customer's options, or after a round where, after Agreement, all subtransactions are aborted.
THE PROTOCOL
Our proposal uses as a building block our previous work (Birjoveanu, 2015) that involves physical products delivery for only one customer and one merchant and that provides fair exchange and anonymity. The Table 1 presents the notations used in the description of our protocol.
Protocol Infrastructure
The following assumptions are made for our protocol: (1) All parties use the same algorithms for encryption, hash, digital signature and the same group blind digital signature protocol mentioned in Table 1. (2) Cryptographic algorithms are strong enough. (3) T T P is the group manager, namely Central Bank, that is known by all parties implied in protocol. T T P does not misbehave or collude with any of parties to provide benefits to another party. (4) There are n merchants M 1 , . . . , M n . C can buy a pack of products from these merchants, and each merchant can provide to C only a certain type of product. C and each M i , have an account to their bank. (5) All banks from group and group manager share a commit-buffer in that each subtransaction's value is stored until the subtransaction is completed successfully or aborted. (6) All banks from group and group manager maintain a global list of coin's serial already spent, validated but unspent, or canceled, to allow any bank to check a coin for double-spending or double-canceling. Each record contains the unique identifier of the subtransaction, the coin's serial and a spent flag. The value of spent flag corresponds to the current state of the coin: spent = 0 means that the coin is validated by T T P but not yet spent, spent = 1 the coin has already been spent, spent = 2 the coin has already been canceled. (7) For each substransaction s i , a destination cabinet DC exists, where the physical products are provided by DA i , and C can collect the product P i with the identifier Pid i from DC only by knowing a password that is set by M i . DC is used to hide the true identity of C if he wants. DC has the ability to digitally sign messages, verify signatures and to check if the password entered by C corresponds to the barcode set on product. After C provides the correct password, DC opens a hatch where packaged product is available to C. DC has a video camera mounted that records when C unwraps each packaged product and check if the product is the ordered one. DC has a device that allows to C, by pushing a button, to send the encrypted recording to T T P. This feature allows on T T P side to store in a buffer PidsAborted the product's identifiers that are not received according to the agreement conditions. C uses this feature only if is not satisfied with the product, as an evidence of wrong product reception. Otherwise, the recording is automatically deleted. (8) Communication channels that are set between parties provides anonymity, except the cases in that the parties choose to reveal their true identities. 
Timestamp generated by T T P, nonce generated by
Coin generated by C, AES symmetric key used in s i , CB's signature on c i obtained by Group Blind Digital Signature (GBDS) protocol (Lysyanskaya and Ramzan, 1998) 
Prelude
We assume that before the starting of the protocol, the following system setup steps are executed: (1) T T P generates a public/private key pair, (T T P pub , T T P prv ) and provides T T P pub to C and each M i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2) When C and each M i create accounts to their banks, each of them generates a public/private key pair, (C pub ,C prv ) and (M ipub , M iprv ), respectively. C provides C pub to CB and each
The banks maintain databases with public keys of their clients associated to their accounts. (3) C and each M i generates a one time public/private key pair
that each of them will use it only in one subtransaction. (4) The Setup and Join phases of the GBDS protocol (Lysyanskaya and Ramzan, 1998) are executed. Briefly, the T T P generates a secret key for group manager and the group's public key. CB and each M i B obtain from T T P the group membership certificate.
Protocol Description
For an aggregate transaction, we define the aggregation operator, denoted by ∧, as follows: Pid 1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pid k meaning that C wishes to buy exactly k products with product's identifiers Pid 1 , . . . , Pid k . For an optional transaction, we define the option operator, denoted by ∨, as follows: Pid 1 ∨ . . . ∨ Pid k meaning that C wishes to buy a product that is exactly one of the products with product's identifiers Pid 1 , . . . , Pid k , where the apparition order of the product's identifiers is the priority given by C. This means that C wishes first of all to buy the product Pid 1 , but if this is not possible, his second option is Pid 2 , and so on.
From the choices of C describing the sequence of products he wishes to buy, we build a tree over the product identifiers selected by C using ∧ and ∨ operators. For efficiency, to represent the tree, we use the left-child, right-sibling representation in that each internal node corresponds to one of the above operators or to a product identifier, while each leaf node corresponds to a product identifier. Each node of the tree is represented by a structure with the following fields: info for storing the useful information (product identifier or one of the operators), left for pointing to the leftmost child of node, and right for pointing to the sibling of the node immediately to the right. The access to tree is realized trough the root.
An example of tree derived from the complex transaction from section 2, is shown in Figure 1 . Pid 1 corresponds to R of 10kΩ, Pid 2 to R of 20kΩ, Pid 3 to C of 100mF, Pid 4 to C of 70mF, Pid 5 to connectors DB35 type and Pid 6 to PCB. The root node has ∧ operator as info. The root does not have any right sibling and its children are the two nodes having ∨ operator as info and the nodes with the info Pid 5 and Pid 6 . A parent-child link is realized as follows: the parent node points only to its leftmost child, and the rest of its children can be accessed starting with the leftmost child via sibling relationship. The first node having as info ∨ operator defines the product corresponding to the optional subtransaction Pid 1 ∨ Pid 2 .
Next, we will describe the phases of the protocol.
Agreement Sub-protocol
We use s i .fst to denote the flag of a subtransaction 
is returned by the the SAgree(C ′ , M i , Pid i ) subprotocol that will be detailed below. So, if the subtransaction in that C ′ buys from M i the product with the identifier Pid i successfully finished
The SAgree sub-protocol will be detailed below in Table 3 .
• if p → info = ∨, then The Agreement sub-protocol, described in Table  2 , recursively calculates Ns(t) (t is the root of the tree derived from the customer's choices), traversing the tree in a similar manner with depth-first search. For any node p of the tree, we use a child array to store the node states of all children of p.
Initially, before the application the Agreement sub-protocol in the first round of the protocol, Ns(p) = λ, for any node p of the tree t (λ is empty string). If the protocol does not terminate after the first round, then before starting a future round, the states of the nodes of tree are: some nodes q that corresponds to the product identifiers have in Ns(q) a unique aborted subtransaction (because some substransactions have been aborted in previous rounds) and all other nodes p have Ns(p) = λ. For efficiency, in future rounds, the protocol will not apply Agreement to those nodes where their state is an aborted subtransaction (as we can see in the lines 1, 6).
At the lines 2-3, if some conditions are met, the protocol computes Ns(p) for a node p, depending on for (all s ∈ Ns(t) such that s.fst = abort) AggAbort(s); s.fst = abort; end for 11.
return Ns(t); 12. k = k→right; j = j + 1; end while 13. if (t→info = Pid i ) Ns(t) = SAgree(C ′ , M i , Pid i ); return Ns(t); 14. else if (t→info = ∨) k = t →left; 15.
while (k→right = NULL) k = k→right; end while 16.
Ns(t) = Ns(k); return Ns(t); 17.
else for (c = 0; c ≤ j -1; c = c + 1) Ns(t) = Ns(t)child[c]; end for 18.
return Ns(t); end if 19. end if the node state of the left most child of p. For a node p with a least two children, the while loop (lines 5-12) computes the node state of any child of p except the left most one. The way in which node state is computed is essential to obtain the fair exchange and atomicity of a complex transaction (lines 7-11): if an aborted subtransaction/sequence of subtransactions leads to aborting the entire aggregate transaction, but some subtransactions from the aggregate transaction successfully completed Agreement, then the ones that are successfully must also be stored in the node state corresponding to ∧ operator (line 9) and afterwards aborted (line 10). In this case, for each subtransaction s that successfully completed Agreement, the AggAbort(s) procedure will be initiated by T T P to cancel the coin involved in s in the same manner with the messages 1.6 ′ .i-1.7 ′ i from Aborting procedure (Table 3) , and the flag of s is set on abort.
For a node with a product identifier as info(line 13), the protocol applies the SAgree sub-protocol in that the customer establishes the agreement conditions with the merchant for buying the product. The node state for a node that corresponds to ∨ operator, for which all subtransactions from all its children are aborted, is computed at the lines 14-16. The node state for a node that corresponds to ∧ operator for that all subtransactions from all its children successfully completed Agreement, is computed at the lines 17-18.
The subtransactions that are initiated in a protocol round can become aborted in different phases of the protocol without solving the customer's options. But, because the customer can have many options w.r.t. the products he wants to buy, new rounds of the protocol must be executed in which are not considered any more the products that are information in the nodes for that the node states have a substransaction already aborted in a previous round.
Next, we will give details about SAgree(C ′ ,M i ,Pid i ) sub-protocol presented in Table  3 . In this sub-protocol C buys a digital coin, validates the coin to T T P, and establishes the agreement with M i on the subtransaction's terms.
C generates a new digital coin that is a number c i of 256 bits consisting of a unique coin serial number represented on the first 224 bits and the coin value in the last 32 bits. The protocol starts with running the GBDS protocol between C and CB on the coin c i . CB transfers the coin value from C acct to the commitbuffer, and after running all steps of the GBDS protocol, C obtains sig CB (c i )-the signature of CB on c i on behalf of the bank's group. CB doesn't know the serial number of c i because his signature on c i is blind, and only knows the identity of the customer and the value of some digital coin purchased by him.
After C gets the group signature on c i , he validates at T T P an encrypted version of c i . C ge- 
where the Aborting(s i ) procedure consist of:
nerates a nonce Sid i as subtransaction identifier, a symmetric key K i and sends to T T P the message 1.1.i.
obtains c i by decrypting {c i } K i , and uses C ′
ipub to verify the signature of the customer on the signed coin. T T P checks the validity of c i by verifying sig CB (c i ) using the group public key, and checks whether c i has already been spent, or validated by T T P (in a previous request) but not yet spent or canceled, by verifying the spent flag of the c i 's serial in the global list of coin's serial. If all checks out, T T P adds c i in the list setting the c i 's spent flag on 0, and sends to C the message 1.2.i. The message 1.2.i contains a timestamp T iT T P , a lifetime of encrypted coin's validity L i , a nonce N iT T P all to avoid replay attacks, and S iT T P -the signature of T T P. On reception, C checks if T iT T P and L i are recently enough, and then verifies S iT T P . C initiates the agreement by sending to M i the message 1.3.i. Po i contains h(N iC ) whose goal is to be used as a barcode on the product and is set by M i such that only who knows the password N iC can collect the product from DC addr ; N iC is kept secret by C,
On reception of the message 1.3.i, M i verifies Po i , if T iT T P and L i are recently enough, the signature of C on Po i , and S iT T P . If M i is satisfied (meaning that the value of the boolean variable M i agreement is 1), S iT T P assures him that {c i } K i represents the encryption of a valid coin (that was signed by a bank from the group, and its lifetime has not expired) of value V i from Po i . Thus, M i sends to C the message 1.4. ′ .i. Further, C sends this request to CB who checks sig CB (c i ), T T P's signature and if c i has not already been spent or canceled. If all checks are satisfied, CB sets the spent flag of c i to 2, transfers the coin value from commit-buffer to C acct , and sends to C a signed acknowledgment of successfully cancellation of c i . So, c i 's value is redeemed by C. If after M i receives 1.3.i, he doesn't continue the sub-protocol, C will apply Aborting(s i ).
After Agreement is completed, Ns(t − root) is stored in the variable Ps that indicates the protocol state. So, Ps is the sequence of the subtransactions for which all successfully completed Agreement or all aborted.
Delivery Sub-protocol
If all subtransactions from Ps successfully completed Agreement, then Delivery can be started to physically deliver the products involved in any subtransaction from Ps
In the Table 4 we give details about Delivery subprotocol for an arbitrary subtransaction s i . The product P i has a barcode h(N iC ) set by M i to control the access of C to DC. P i with this barcode is taken by 
DA i from M i to be delivered. M i sends to DA i a delivery request message 2.1.i. DA i obtains M ′ ipub and checks the signature of M i . In the message 2.2.i, DA i collects the product P i from M i . To confirm the collection of P i , DA i sends to M i an acknowledgment in the message 2.3.i. In the message 2.4.i, DA i posts P i to DC. Upon receiving P i from DA i , DC confirms him in the message 2.5.i by a signed acknowledgment which DA i forwards to M i , and M i to C. C collects P i from DC using N iC and checks if the collected product meets the specifications from Po i . If C is satisfied, he sends in the message 2.7.i a signed acknowledgment to DC.
If all subtransactions from Ps successfully completed Delivery, then each subtransaction's flag from Ps is set to 2.
Payment Sub-protocol
If C collects all products involved in any subtransaction from Ps and is satisfied, then he sends the payment for each product to the suitable merchant. Below, we present the Payment sub-protocol for an arbitrary subtransaction s i from Ps. If in a subtransaction s i from Ps, C does not send to M i the decryption key K i of the encrypted coin or sends to M i in 3.1.i a wrong decryption key, then M i sends to T T P all the messages received/sent from/to C in s i . T T P checks the messages of s i and if all checks are successfully, then sends K i to M i , the key that is in possession of T T P from the Agreement sub-protocol:
3.2.i :
using K i , checks the validity of sig CB (c i ) and continues the sub-protocol with 3.2.i.
The Complex Transaction Protocol
Next, we describe the protocol for complex transactions, presented in Table 5 , that relies on the three phases discussed above. t is the root of the tree derived from the choices of C. Initially, Empty(Ns(t)) sets Ns(p) = λ, for any node p of the tree t. A while iteration executes a round of the protocol, that executes the three phases of the protocol. At the line 3, Ps variable retains the sequence of subtransactions that have run Agreement corresponding to options provided by C. If all subtransactions from Ps successfully completed Agreement, then Delivery may take place to physically deliver the products involved in any subtransaction from Ps. At the line 5, Ps retains the sequence of subtransactions that have run Delivery. Further, if all subtransactions from Ps successfully completed Delivery, then Payment takes place and the sequence of subtransactions that solves the options of C is returned.
If after Agreement took place, Ps is a sequence of subtransactions that are all aborted, then the options of C can not be successfully solved. In this case, at the line 10, the subtransactions sequence will be returned as an evidence of the protocol's failure. The case in that after Agreement took place, all subtransactions s 1 . . . s k from Ps successfully completed Agreement, but some of these subtransactions did not successfully completed Delivery of physical products (e.g. some merchant doesn't post the product or posts a wrong product), is treated at the line 8. In this case, the Aborting(s i ) procedure is applied for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, to abort all the substransactions from Ps that successfully completed Agreement. According to assumption 7 from the section 3.1, DC has a device that allows C to send to T T P the encrypted recording of the moment when C receives products that are not in conformity with the agreement established. The identifiers of these products are stored in the buffer PidsAborted used at the line 9 to update the tree with the root t. Update(t) updates Ns(p), for any node p of the tree, as follows:
we have the following cases: if Ns(p) has the flag on abort, then Ns(p) remains unchan-
By Update(t), the states of the nodes corresponding to products from aborted subtransactions in the current protocol's round are mentained in the tree with the root t, so that these products are not taken into consideration in a new protocol's round.
In a new round (while iteration), the protocol searches a new sequence of subtransactions that will successfully finish all three sub-protocols, and in this way satisfying the options of C. The protocol terminates when encounters a round in which the protocol state Ps computed after that round contains a sequence of subtransactions that solves C's options, or when encounters a round in that Ps computed after Agreement has all subtransactions aborted. In the last case, the protocol can not solve the options of C.
SECURITY ANALYSIS

Fair-exchange
For a tree t that describes the choices of C, we define solve(t) -the sequence of products obtained by C after the protocol execution and that solves the choices of C. solve(t) is defined depending on the protocol state Ps calculated after the protocol execution.
If after a protocol's round Ps = s 1 . . . s m such that s i .fst = 3 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then solve(t) = Pid 1 . . . Pid m meaning the products from all subtransactions that successfully terminates all three subprotocols. Otherwise, if in a protocol's round after Agreement sub-protocol, Ps is a sequence of aborted subtransactions, then solve(t) = abort meaning that the protocol can not solve the options of C.
Our protocol assures fair exchange if after the protocol execution, either C gets the sequence of physical products solve(t) = Pid 1 . . . Pid m and each M i gets the payment for the product Pid i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, or none do. From the construction of our protocol, after its execution, C can obtain either a sequence of products that solves his choices, or nothing. Furthermore, after the protocol execution, C can 't obtain a sequence of products Pid 1 . . . Pid k = solve(t).
If C and each M i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, behave honestly, the proposed protocol assures fair exchange. In what follows, we will consider all possible scenarios in which any M i or C behave dishonest or prematurely abort the protocol. If C behaves dishonest, then the following scenarios are possible:
1. After Delivery sub-protocol took place in some protocol's round, Ps = s 1 . . . s k is a sequence of subtransactions that successfully completed Delivery sub-protocol. So, C collected all products involved in any subtransaction from Ps and he is satisfied. However, Payment sub-protocol, for a subtransaction s i from Ps, where 1 ≤ i ≤ k, C does not send to M i the decryption key of the encrypted coin or sends to M i a wrong decryption key. This scenario is solved as mentioned in Payment subprotocol, T T P providing to M i the correct key.
2. C sends the same coin to T T P (in 1. 4. In Agreement sub-protocol, C sends to CB 1.7 ′ .i many times for multiple redemption of the same canceled coin. This scenario is solved because CB checks if the coin received in a cancellation request has already been canceled.
If M i behaves dishonest, then the following scenarios are possible:
1. In a subtransaction s i from Agreement subprotocol, M i receives from C ′ a correct message 1.3.i, but he sends to C ′ an abort message 1.4 ′ .i or doesn't continue the sub-protocol. Such behavior brings no benefit to M i because he is in possession of an encrypted coin with a key that does not know, so he can't get the payment. But C has bought a coin which can not be used by him. In both scenarios, C applies Aborting(s i ) to cancel and to redeem the coin, and to abort s i . If the aborted s i is a component of an aggregate transaction, then all other subtransactions from the aggregate that successfully completed Agreement sub-protocol will be aborted by AggAbort procedure and by setting their flags on abort.
2. After Agreement sub-protocol took place, Ps = s 1 . . . s k is a sequence of subtransactions that successfully completed Agreement sub-protocol. In s i from Ps, M i sent 1.4.i to C ′ , but in Delivery sub-protocol he doesn't post the product or posts a product that doesn't comply with the specifications from Po i . M i does not have any benefit from this behavior, but can prejudice the other honest merchants involved in s 1 . . . s k . In s i , C pushes the button of the DC's device that allows sending to T T P the recording of the moment when C unwraps the packed product, proving to T T P that the product is wrong. Because the product from s i is not complying with the specifications from Po i , the rest of the products involved in the sequence s 1 . . . s k can't lead to solve(t). So, C sends to T T P all the messages received/sent from/to each M j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ k. T T P checks the information received from C, applies Aborting(s j ), where 1 ≤ j ≤ k and triggers an off-line procedure sending to M i the proof of his dishonest behavior. Also, T T P requests from M i the payment for the transportation services of products provided by the honest merchants to DC and back. After T T P receives the payment, he returns the transportation costs to each honest merchant from s 1 . . . s k .
3. In Payment sub-protocol, M i sends many times the same 3.2.i for multiple redemption of the same coin. This scenario is solved by M i B checking if the coin received in 3.2.i has already been spent.
Each party involved in the protocol must keep a record of every message sent or received in protocol including signed acknowledgments of DC and DA i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. DC and DA i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, have no interest not to follow the protocol steps, because their interest is to get profit from fees for such services provided in e-commerce transactions. However, if one of the parties mentioned above behaves dishonest, the other parties send the records to T T P to trigger off-line mechanisms to ensure fairness.
Anonymity
Our protocol ensures the customer's anonymity if no party and no coalition between parties can make a link between the true identity of the customer, C, and the pseudo identity of the customer, C ′ , which he uses in protocol.
In our protocol, we use an electronic cash payment based on group blind digital signatures on behalf of the banks. The only steps from our protocol in that the customer uses his true identity are the GBDS protocol's steps and in the message 1.7
′ .i in that the customer cancel his coin, because CB must know C acct to charge it with the coin's value or to redeem the coin's value. In the GBDS protocol, CB knows only that C bought a coin with a certain value, but it doesn't know the serial of the coin. Following, CB can't associate C with the coin bought by him, maintaining thus the anonymity of the customer. Also, in the message 1.7 ′ .i, the customer reveals his true identity only to CB, but this does not destroy the customer's anonymity because the coin will be canceled and not used 
Entity
Info C M i CB M i B DA i DC C y n y n n n M i y y n y y n CB y n y n n n M i B n y n y n n DA i n y n n y y DC y y n n y y C ′ y y n n n y c i y y n y n n C&s i y n n n n n C ′ &s i y y n n n y anymore. Another feature of the GBDS protocol is the anonymity of CB: any party can check if sig CB (c i ) is valid, without knowing who is the bank that signed the coin c i . CB is not known by any other party (except C), so, CB can't participate in no coalition with any other party to destroy the customer's anonymity.
To ensure the customer's anonymity when C collects the physical products, our protocol doesn't use the customer's correspondence address but uses a destination cabinet where the product is placed. We show in Table 6 , the information that each party in the protocol knows after protocol execution. The information have the following meaning. For example, we consider the first row: y under the column C and CB means that C and CB know C -the true identity of the customer; n under the column M i , M i B, DA i and DC means that the true identity of the customer is not known to M i , M i B, DA i and DC. C&s i means that C performs the subtransaction s i . The meaning is extended for C ′ &s i .
From the Table 6 , we observe that no party alone has sufficient information to link the true identity of the customer, C, with the pseudo identity C ′ . Only C can disclose this information if he wants.
We analyze the coalition of the maximum size that can be formed by parties involved in protocol to try to destroy the customer's anonymity. The coalition of the maximum size consists of the following parts: M 1 , . . . , M n , M 1 B, . . . , M n B, DA 1 , . . . , DA n , and DC. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, DA i has information only about entities M i , and DC, and no information about C. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, M i B have no information about C. DC has the information C ′ &s 1 , . . . ,C ′ &s n , but no information about C. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, M i has the information C ′ &s i . So, the only information related to customer obtained by the coalition of the maximum size is C ′ &s 1 , . . . ,C ′ &s n , but no information about the customer's true identity. Thus, the customer's anonymity is preserved.
CONCLUSIONS
Fair exchange in complex transactions is much harder to obtain compare to fair exchange in a subtransaction, because fair exchange obtained in all subtransactions from a complex transaction does not directly implies fair exchange in entire complex transaction. The complexity of our protocol is higher for complex transactions containing both aggregate and optional transactions then for complex transactions containing only aggregate transactions. The requirement for optional transactions impose the protocol execution in multiple rounds to solve the customer's options. We remark that obtaining the customer's anonymity in complex transactions is not simple. To obtain the anonymity of the customer, the challenge in our protocol was to guarantee this requirement both in payment and collection of physical products.
We proposed an e-commerce protocol taking into consideration several requirements that are not considered so far together in literature: physical products delivery, aggregate transaction, optional transaction, fair exchange and anonymity. If some of the requirements mentioned above are not needed in an e-commerce application, then we will use simplified versions of the proposed protocol. Thus, if optional transactions are not required in a complex transaction e-commerce protocol, then only one round of the protocol is necessary and Agreement sub-protocol is replaced with customer initiating simultaneously all subtransactions for agreement on terms. If the customer's anonymity is not required, then a simpler payment method that replaces GBDS protocol is used. Also, in this case, the destination cabinet and all messages involving him are eliminated.
Future work will include formal verification of the proposed protocol and extending the protocol by taken into consideration of active intermediary agents (that are not delivery agents) between customer and merchants.
